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Abstract
The paper proposes a mechanism that may implement ﬁrst-best
eﬀort in simultaneous teams. Within the framework of this mecha-
nism, each team members is obliged to make a ﬁxed, non-contingent
payment, and chooses his individual eﬀort. After the output is pro-
duced, each team member receives a gross payment that equals the
actual team output. We demonstrate that a Nash equilibrium exists in
which each team member chooses ﬁrst-best eﬀort. We call this mech-
anism “Anti-Sharing” since it solves the sharing problem that causes
the ineﬃciency in teams. The Anti-Sharing mechanism requires one
player to specialize on the role of an “Anti-Sharer”. With an exter-
nal Anti-Sharer who works on a non-proﬁt base, the mechanism can
implement ﬁrst-best eﬀort. If, however, the Anti-Sharer comes from
within the team and desires a positive payoﬀ, then the mechanism may
implement not more than second-best eﬀort. The latter version of the
model could be interpreted as a new theory of ﬁrms and partnerships
in the sense of the theory of Alchian and Demsetz (1972).
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11 Introduction
This paper proposes a new mechanism to solve the problem of ineﬃcient
eﬀort provision in teams. Even if the team output is deterministic and team
members are risk-neutral, the sharing of the output induces the players to
spend suboptimal low eﬀort. We call this mechanism “Anti-Sharing”. Within
its framework, the team members are obliged to make a ﬁxed payment to
an “Anti-Sharer”. Each team member chooses his eﬀort, which produces
the actual team output. This team output is collected by the Anti-Sharer,
who ﬁnally pays exactly this amount to each of the team members. With
an external Anti-Sharer who works on a non-proﬁt basis, this mechanism
implements the ﬁrst-best eﬀorts as a Nash equilibrium.
If, however, one of the team members takes over the role of the Anti-Sharer,
only a suboptimal solution can be implemented. We prove that an internal
Anti-Sharer must not be productive. Thus, our mechanism can be interpreted
as a theory of a ﬁrm, since it provides an explanation for the division of labor
between inactive (senior) partners and active (junior) partners.
The idea that a team member assumes a specialized role to solve the team
problem is very similar to the proposal of Alchian/Demsetz (1972). In their
seminal paper, these authors have based their theory of the ﬁrm on the idea
of team production: if the inputs of the agents are not linear separable, then
individual incentive contracts are of no use. According to their proposal,
one agent should become the residual claimant and monitor the eﬀort of the
other agents. Being the residual claimant motivates the monitor to fulﬁll his
monitoring duties. However, this proposal requires the eﬀort to be observable
by the specialized monitor.
However, in the Alchian/Demsetz model specialization in monitoring may
raise opportunity costs, since it is likely that the monitoring task may keep
this agent from contributing productive eﬀort to the team output. If mon-
itoring is possible without opportunity costs, then a ﬁrst-best solution can
be achieved. Taking the opportunity costs of monitoring into account, the
Alchian/Demsetz solution is not ﬁrst-best, due to two reasons: ﬁrst of all,
the monitor’s eﬀort is not contributed to the output. Moreover, this may
decrease the other agents’ marginal productivity if, as it is usually assumed
for team problems, the production function is characterized by positive cross-
partials.
Holmstrom (1982) has shown that, within a fairly general framework, budget-
balanced sharing schemes are unable to induce a ﬁrst-best eﬀort. Unbalanced
2rules would implement ﬁrst-best eﬀort as a Nash quilibrium. However, such
a Nash equilibrium is not subgame perfect, since it would require the agents
to waste a part of the output. No agent anticipates such a threat to be
actually carried out. Without some outside enforcer who has an interest
in enforcing such an ex-post ineﬃcient punishment, the unbalanced sharing
scheme introduced by Holmstrom would not work.
Our mechanism is diﬀerent from the outside enforcer of a non-balanced shar-
ing rule in Holmstrom (1982). In our model, the payments to the Anti-Insurer
are not contingent on the observation of an output which is smaller than the
eﬃcient one. Our mechanism obliges the agents to make a ﬁxed payment to
the Anti-Sharer. In turn, they receive a payment that equals the full actual
output (instead of only a share). The ﬁxed payments enable the Anti-Sharer
to pay each of the team members. Since these payments are ﬁxed, they are
irrelevant for the eﬀort decision of the agents. Therefore, our mechanism is
diﬀerent from “bonding” as mentioned in Holmstrom (1982).
Rasmusen (1987) has demonstrated that, in the case of risk-averse team-
members, a budget balanced Sharing contract may implement the ﬁrst-best
eﬀort. The mechanism is based on random punishment in case of under-
performance. Strausz (1999) has derived a simple sharing rule for sequen-
tial teams that is budget-balanced (thus credible) in equilibrium, and which
implements ﬁrst-best eﬀorts if earlier inputs are observable by those team
members who move later during the game.1 In our model, we focus on si-
multaneous teams that consist of risk-neutral agents. Hence, the proposals
of Rasmusen and Strausz are not applicable.
Finsinger/Pauly (1990) have applied the idea of Holmstrom to Law and Eco-
nomics2 and demonstrated that an optimal liability rule would require bur-
dening both parties with the full damage. A budget balanced liability rule,
however, leads to an over-insurance problem. At least one party (or even
both) does not have to bear the full damages, and thus enjoys too much
insurance. E.g., strict liability and no liability imply that one party bears
the full risk, whereas the respective other party is fully insured. Under neg-
ligence rules as well as under liability rules that require each party to bear
a part of the damage, there is no situation in which each party has to bear
the full damage simultaneously.
The idea of Cooter/Porat (2002) proposes “Anti-Insurance” as a solution
to the over-insurance problem. If, in a tort case with two parties, a third
1See L¨ ulfesmann (2001) for a generalization of this result.
2See already Brown (1973), Coase (1960). See also G¨ orke (2002).
3person plays the role of an “Anti-Insurer”, then both parties can be exposed
to the full risk, which provides incentives to spend eﬃcient eﬀort. Under
the strict liability rule, e.g., the Anti-Insurer initially pays an amount that
equals the damage to the insured party. If an accident occurs, the uninsured
party bears the damage, whereas the insured party has to pay the same
amount to the Anti-Insurer. Thus, both parties have to pay full damages
in case of an accident. The ex-ante payment by the Anti-Insurer is required
to satisfy the participation constraints of the two parties. If the liability
rule distributes the damage among the parties, then the ex-ante payment
from the Anti-Insurer and the ex-post payments to the Anti-Insurer have
to be adjusted accordingly.3 This mechanism is diﬀerent from the one in
Varian (1994), where each agent pays the other agents for their eﬀort, and
simultaneously demands from all agents a compensation for his own eﬀort.
Varian’s mechanism requires each of the n team members to announce 2n
prices, whereas in the simplest version of the Anti-Insurance mechanism, only
one payment of each team member to the Anti-Insurer has to be computed.
The paper by Cooter/Porat (2002) is closely related to ours, since the au-
thors have already pointed out that their idea can also be applied to un-
certain gains. A diﬀerence between their paper and ours is that our model
can be applied to teams with deterministic output, while their paper fo-
cuses on stochastic outcomes. Note furthermore that the Anti-Insurer in
Cooter/Porat (2002) is introduced as an additional player, while we also an-
alyze Anti-Sharers who come from within the team. Insofar, our model could
be interpreted as an explanation of the division of labor between (inactive)
senior partners and (productive) junior partners. Partnerships are deﬁned
by Farrell/Scotchmer (1988) as coalitions that divide their output equally.
Their concept diﬀers from ours since they expressly exclude team production
in the sense of Alchian/Demsetz (1972). Consequently, they focus on the
optimal team size, while moral hazard within the partnership plays no role
in their analysis. This is also true for the model in Lang/Gordon (1995), who
explain partnership as a risk-pooling device. In our model, risk is excluded.
In section 2, we set up our model and notation by repeating the results of
team production under a Sharing contract as demonstrated by Holmstrom
(1982). We maintain the assumption that individual eﬀorts are unobservable.
This excludes the application of monitoring - as in Alchian/Demsetz (1972)
- or sequential teams - as in Strausz (1999).
Section 3 demonstrates the implementation of ﬁrst-best eﬀort by an external
Anti-Sharing contract, oﬀered to the team members by a zero-proﬁt Anti-
3See also Polinsky/Rubinfeld (2003) with a related idea.
4Sharer. The introduction of an Anti-Sharer addresses the sharing problem,
as expressed by Lang/Dordon (1995): “Pooling of proﬁts denies a partner the
entire value of his marginal eﬀort and therefore reduces the eﬀort”. Under an
(external) Anti-Sharing contract, the complete value of each team member’s
eﬀort appears in his respective yield function.
However, the case of an external Anti-Sharer who operates on a zero-proﬁt
base is not the most realistic one. More relevant appears to be a scenario in
which one of the team members takes over the role of the Anti-Sharer. In
section 4 we therefore endogenize the Anti-Sharing. If a team that consists
of n agents faces the problem that the spontaneous interaction leads to an
equilibrium with ineﬃcient eﬀort, then one out of these n agents may serve
as Anti-Sharer. An internal Anti-Sharing contract may implement cannot
implement ﬁrst-best eﬀorts among the remaining (n − 1) agents, since it is
necessary to keep the agent who plays the role of the Anti-Sharer from con-
tributing productive eﬀort. However, we demonstrate the conditions under
which an internal Anti-Sharing contract leads to a Pareto-improvement for
the team members, compared to the situation under a Sharing contract.
In section 5, we discuss the constitutional aspects of internal Anti-Sharing: if
the team members are homogenous with respect to their productivity, then
an equilibrium requires the ex-ante payoﬀ of the Anti-Sharer to equal those
of the remaining team mambers. In a case of a heterogenous agents, the
agent with the lowest productivity should assume the role of the Anti-Sharer.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Teams without “Anti-Sharing”
2.1 Basic notation
Consider a group of n agents who may spend eﬀort ei,i = 1..n to produce
an output Y (e1..en).4 The individual eﬀorts are assumed to be unobservable,
thus not contractible.5 The agents are assumed to dislike eﬀort. We denote
4The subscript i denotes player i = 1..n. We also use the subscript i to denote the
derivative of Y with respect to player i’s eﬀort ei.
5It is not possible to infer the individual eﬀort from the observed output if n > 2, or if
output is stochastic, i.e., when a random variable inﬂuences the output. An example for
the latter would be a situation where the agents’ eﬀorts increase the probability of success,
whereas the project value is ﬁxed. However, even if an agent could infer another agent’s
eﬀort, this still does not imply that eﬀorts are veriﬁable.
5the eﬀort cost of agent i as ci(ei),6 and assume that individual costs are
independent of other players’ eﬀort choices.7 We assume furthermore that
players’ utility is separable in wealth and eﬀort cost - the players maximize
their income minus their eﬀort cost.
To simplify the notation, we employ the following convention for eﬀort vec-
tors. While a lower case letter ei denotes the individual eﬀort of player i, a
capital letter E represents a vector of individual eﬀorts, with the following
subscripts:
• E is the eﬀort vector of all n players: E = (e1..en).
• E(−i) is the eﬀort vector of all n players except player i: E(−i) =
(e1..ei−1,ei+1..en). Consequently, E(−i,−j) denotes the eﬀort vector
without the contributions of players i and j.
• For convenience, we write E = (E(−i),ei) = (E(−i,−j),ei,ej).
The production function Y (E) is twice diﬀerentiable, continuous, and in-
creasing in individual eﬀorts, but with diminishing marginal returns: Yi >
0 > Yii. We assume Yij > 0; thus, eﬀorts are not linear separable and a team
production problem exists in the sense of Alchian/Demsetz (1972).8
2.2 Optimal and equilibrium eﬀorts
The socially optimal eﬀort (E∗) solves
E




and therefore satisﬁes the following ﬁrst order conditions:9
6Note that we do not assume the agents to be homogeneous. Individual productivity
and eﬀort cost may be diﬀerent.
7Diﬀerent in Strausz (1999), who introduces individual cost functions that are decreas-
ing in other agents’ eﬀort. We follow an alternative way to model a team problem and
assume an output function with positive cross derivatives, see below.
8We exclude the case of negative cross-partials.
9Due to the assumptions we have made concerning the second derivatives, we can







∀ i = 1..n (1)
All players should choose their individual eﬀort such that their marginal
productivity equals their marginal cost, given that all other players have
chosen optimally.
However, as Holmstrom (1982) has demonstrated, with a budget-balanced
Sharing contract the players will not have an incentive to do so: si denotes





i denote the actual choice of player i under a Sharing contract. In
equilibrium, i’s actual choice solves the following maximization problem:
e
0
i = argmaxsiY (E
0
(−i),ei) − ci(ei).







∀ i = 1..n (2)
Note that the right hand side of equation (1) equals the right hand side of
equation (2). The diﬀerence between socially optimal and individually ratio-
nal behavior lies in the respective left hand side. If, given a budget-balanced
Sharing contract, a player exists whose share is greater than zero, then at
least one other player exists whose share is smaller than one. Therefore, at
least for some player (if not for all of them) the left hand side of equation (2)
must be smaller than in equation (1), even if all other players were choosing
eﬃcient eﬀort. This leads to two diﬀerent disincentives:10
1. Since at least some players acquire a share smaller than one, they have
an incentive to choose e0
i < e∗
i.
2. If other players exist who choose e0
j < e∗
j, and Yij > 0, player i’s
marginal productivity decreases, which motivates him to further de-
crease his eﬀort.
10The ﬁrst ineﬃciency eﬀect is taken into account in Holmstrom (1982), but not he
second.
7In a team according to the Alchian/Demsetz (1972) terminology, i.e., with
a positive cross derivative, the moral hazard problem is even worse than
predicted by the Holmstrom model. Without some additional institution,
the n agents will produce Y 0 = Y (E0) as their output, which is smaller than
the eﬃcient output Y ∗ = Y (E∗).
The individual payoﬀ in equilibrium amounts to π0
i = siY 0−ci(e0
i). Assuming
positive cross-partials, this is for all agents smaller than the individual payoﬀ
if all agents choose eﬃciently, i.e., π∗
i = siY ∗ − ci(e∗
i). Even an agent who
is entitled to a share si = 1 would receive less than Y ∗, due to Yij > 0 and
e0
j < e∗
j∀ j 6= i. The diﬀerence between the eﬃcient and the equilibrium
payoﬀ leaves room for a Pareto-improvement, even if the institution that
implements a higher output level raises transaction costs.
3 First-best Anti-Sharing
In this section we add an external Anti-Sharer to a team of n members. The
Anti-Sharer thus is introduced as a player (n + 1). Moreover, we assume
the external Anti-Sharer to be competitive, thus to work without proﬁt.
We demonstrate that, under these circumstances, ﬁrst-best eﬀort is a Nash





The contract between the team members and the external zero-proﬁt Anti-
Sharer consists of two components. The contract obliges
• each of the n team members to make a ﬁxed payment n−1
n Y (E∗) to the
Anti-Sharer.
• the team members to deliver the actual output Y (E00) to the Anti-
Sharer (who becomes residual claimant).
• the Anti-Sharer to pay Y (E00) to each of the team members.
We will prove the following11
Proposition 1: If an external, zero-proﬁt Anti-Sharer oﬀers the
above contract to the n team-members, then
11A parallel result has been demonstrated in Cooter/Porat (2002).
8a) To choose the eﬃcient eﬀort e∗
i is a Nash equilibrium for all
team members i = 1..n.
b) If the team members choose eﬃcient eﬀort, then the mech-
anism obeys the zero-proﬁt condition.
The proof of part a) is based on the following maximization problem that
each team member solves by choosing his actual eﬀort:
e
00
i = argmaxY (E
00













∀ i = 1..n (3)
which is identical to equation (1), the condition for ﬁrst-best eﬀort. Thus,
we have established that it is a Nash-equilibrium for all team members to
choose ﬁrst best eﬀort under this mechanism. It is individually rational to
choose the eﬃcient eﬀort if all other team-members do the same.
To prove part b) of proposition 1, we calculate the Anti-Sharer’s net payoﬀ.
He collects (n − 1)Y ∗ + Y (E00) and pays out nY (E00). Obviously, his net
payoﬀ is zero if E00 = E∗; q.e.d.
The mechanism is not budget-balanced if the team members do not choose
ﬁrst-best eﬀorts. Without Anti-Sharer, a Sharing contract that is not budget-
balanced imposes a credibility problem (the parties would be motivated to
spend eﬃcient eﬀort, if they were credibly committed to throw away some
part of the output in case of ineﬃcient eﬀort, but they anticipate that they
would not do so). However, the existence of an Anti-Sharer avoids this
credibility problem, since he may claim the agents’ payments and only has to
pay out their actual achievement. If the parties choose less than the eﬃcient
eﬀort, then the Anti-Sharer’s net payoﬀ accrues to (n−1)Y ∗−(n−1)Y (E00)
which is positive.
Individual rationality keeps the team-members form investing more than the
eﬃcient eﬀort, since they had to bear the eﬀort costs. Thus, the Anti-Sharer
does not face the problem to have to pay out more than he collects. The only
weakness of this mechanism is that the eﬃcient equilibrium is not unique. If
some team players expect their colleagues to spend less than eﬃcient eﬀort,
9it is individually rational to spend lower eﬀort as well (due to the positive
cross-partial), which makes the expectation self-conﬁrming.
The mechanism implements ﬁrst-best eﬀorts since each team member calcu-
lates with the total actual output Y (E00) - and not with a share siY (E00) - in
his individual yield function. Therefore, the total marginal return of his ef-
fort is internalized. Of course, the actual eﬀort can be distributed only once,
but the diﬀerence between nY 00 (what the n team members are heading for)
and Y 00 (what is actually distributed among them) is covered by their ﬁxed
payment. This payment is ﬁxed, since it is independent of their actually
chosen eﬀort.
However, from the viewpoint of institutional economics this approach is not
satisfying. It leaves the question unanswered where the player (n+1) comes
from. If he does not appear out of the blue, but has already been present
in society before the team chooses to employ the mechanism under scrutiny,
then the question arises what this agent has been doing before. If this was
a productive activity, then being employed by the team may keep him from
pursuing this alternative activity.
4 Internal Anti-Sharing
4.1 Setup
In the previous section, the ﬁrst-best solution was generated by introducing
an additional player, the Anti-Sharer. This leaves two questions unanswered:
• Where does this (n + 1)st player come from?
• What are the opportunity costs (in the sense of omitted productive
activity) of being Anti-Sharer?
In this section, we analyze the case when one of the n team members plays
the role of the Anti-Sharer. Without loss of generality, we assume agent
number n to specialize in Anti-Sharing for the other (n − 1) agents who
remain productive. An Anti-Sharing contract requires the productive (n−1)
agents to make a lump-sum payment to the Anti-Sharer.12 After the (n−1)
12We disregard liquidity constraints, since the lump-sum payment does not actually
have to be made; it is suﬃcient for the mechanism to work that the payment is subtracted
from the respective agent’s payoﬀ after the output has been produced.
10agents have chosen their eﬀorts, each of them receives a payment that equals
the actual output from the Anti-Sharer. Note that these payments do not
necessarily have to be made in chronological order; it is suﬃcient for the
players to be obliged by the Anti-Sharing contract to make these payments.
We therefore assume the ﬁxed payments and the actually produced output
to be contractible.
The lump-sum payment may consist of two components: a fee for player n
and the necessary payment that enables player n to pay out the actual output
(n − 1) times. The fee can be zero or positive. Let us describe the Anti-
Sharing mechanism that implements (second-best) eﬃciency by describing
the necessary contractual provisions in more detail:
1. The (n − 1) productive agents pay an amount of
n − 2
n − 1
ˆ Y + Ti
where ˆ ei describes the eﬃcient eﬀort of player i = 1...(n − 1) and
ˆ Y = Y (ˆ e1..ˆ e(n−1),0) represents the eﬃcient output, given that player
n contributes en = 0. Note that both components of this payment are
ﬁxed amounts of money which are independent of the actually chosen
eﬀort of either player.
2. Each player i = 1..(n−1) chooses his actual eﬀort, denoted as ˜ ei, which
leads to an actual output
˜ Y = Y (˜ e1..˜ en−1,0)
3. Player n acquires the actual output.
4. Player n pays ˜ Y to each of the other (n − 1) players.
4.2 Optimal eﬀorts with internal Anti-Sharing
Since the agent n abstains from productive activity, the highest output that
can be achieved by making use of an internal Anti-Sharer is smaller than the
ﬁrst-best output.13 Moreover, the lack of eﬀort exerted by agent n decreases
the marginal productivity of all other agents 1..(n − 1). Hence, the maxi-
mum output under the Anti-Sharing mechanism is smaller than the ﬁrst-best
13In a situation where the agents’ eﬀorts are perfect complements, Anti-Sharing thus is
useless.
11output Y (E∗). Let us now derive the condition for optimal eﬀorts under the
assumption en = 0. The optimal eﬃcient eﬀorts ˆ ei,i = 1..(n − 1) maximize




and satisfy the ﬁrst-order conditions (we again assume second-order condi-





∀ i = 1..(n − 1) (4)
4.3 Equilibrium eﬀorts with Anti-Sharing
Now we prove the following
Proposition 2: If in a team of n members, player n assumes the
role of an internal Anti-Sharer and oﬀers the above contract to
the other n − 1 team-members, then:
a) It is a Nash-equilibrium to choose the eﬃcient eﬀort ˆ ei for
all team members i = 1..(n − 1).
b) If the team members choose eﬃcient eﬀort and
P
Ti = 0,
then the mechanism obeys the zero-proﬁt condition.
We denote the individually rational eﬀorts of player 1..(n − 1), given that
player n chooses en = 0, as ˜ ei. We have to demonstrate that ∀ i = 1..(n−1) :
˜ ei = ˆ ei. The equilibrium eﬀort of agent i = 1..(n − 1) is determined by
˜ ei = argmaxY ( ˜ E(−i,−n),ei,0) −
n − 2
n − 1
ˆ Y − Ti − ci(ei)





∀ i = 1..(n − 1) (5)
12If all of the (n − 1) productive players choose their optimal reply on en = 0,
then equations (5) and (4) are identical. These eﬀorts hence constitute a
Nash equilibrium.14
Part b) of the proposition requires to show that, with
P
Ti = 0, this mecha-
nism is budget balanced in the eﬃcient Nash equilibrium. The Anti-Sharer
receives (n − 1) times the lump-sum payment, which amounts to




If the players i = 1..(n − 1) choose ˜ ei = ˆ e1, then the actual output is ˆ Y .
Thus, the net payment of player n is
(n − 2)ˆ Y +
n−1 X
i=1
Ti + ˆ Y − (n − 1)ˆ Y
which equals
P
Ti. If the productive agents choose optimal eﬀorts, then
the payoﬀ of player n equals the sum of fees. Hence, if
P
Ti = 0, then the
mechanism is budget balanced in this Nash equilibrium.
If the other n−1 players choose suboptimal eﬀorts, then the mechanism is not
balanced. Even tough, the mechanism is credible, since the Anti-Sharer may
retain the remainder. It is in his vital interest to carry out the mechanism.
4.4 Is a ﬁrst-best solution possible?
In this section we allow for player n, who assumes the role of the Anti-Sharer,
to contribute eﬀort. We show that, even though all n team members may
contribute eﬀort, Anti-Sharing is unable to implement the ﬁrst-best outcome
among the n agents.
In this setting, the Anti-Sharing contract requires the n − 1 other agents to
make a lump-sum payment ˇ Ti = Y ∗/n to agent n, who becomes the only
residual claimant. Having made this arrangements, all n agents choose their
eﬀort. And ﬁnally, agent n pays their shares of the actual output to his n−1
14This is one Nash equilibrium among others; the mechanism turns the initial Prisoners’
Dilemma into a coordination game. E.g., ei = 0 ∀ i = 1..(n − 1) is a Nash equilibrium as
well. We disregard here the problem of equilibrium selection. According to the selection
criterion of Pareto-dominance the parties would play the eﬃcient equilibrium.
13partners. We assume zero transaction costs and free competition among the
n agents for the position of the Anti-Sharer. Thus, this position does not
allow agent n to generate an individual rent; he only receives a share due to
his productive eﬀort choice. The outcome is described by the following
Proposition 3: If a team member oﬀers an external zero-proﬁt
Anti-Sharing contract to each team member of the team, includ-
ing himself, then all team members choose less than optimal ef-
fort.
We label the equilibrium eﬀorts chosen under this scheme as ˇ E. In formal
notation, this proposition claims ˇ T = n−1
n Y (E∗) ⇒ ˇ E < E∗. The proof
requires us to analyze the maximization problems of the agents 1..(n−1) and
the internal Anti-Sharer n separately. We start with the agents j = 1..(n−1):
each one of these chooses his eﬀort such that




∗ + Y ( ˇ E(−j)) − cj(ej).
Thus, ˇ ej satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition





which is equivalent to equation (1) above, the condition for a ﬁrst-best out-
come, provided that all players (including n) do the same.
However, player n remains to be analyzed: he receives the lump-sum pay-
ments from the other players and the actual outcome. He has to pay out
n − 1 times the actual outcome and to bear his own eﬀort costs. Thus, he
chooses
ˇ en = argmax(n − 1)Y
∗ + Y ( ˇ E(−n),en) − (n − 1)Y ( ˇ E(−n),en) − cn(en)
to satisfy the following ﬁrst-order condition:
(2 − n)





! = 0 (6)
which yields ˇ en < e∗
n. Note that n > 2 implies that the left-hand side of
equation (6) is negative, thus ˇ en = 0. All the other players hence face a
14situation in which, due to the assumption Yij > 0, the marginal productivity
of their input is smaller than in the case where all n players choose eﬃcient
eﬀort. Therefore, ∀ i = 1..n : ˇ ei < e∗
i; q.e.d.
The fact that player n collects the actual product and has to pay it out (n−1)
times distorts his incentives to contribute eﬀort. Therefore, the successful
application of the Anti-Sharing mechanism requires the Anti-Sharer to be
unproductive. He is supposed to be (or to become) an outsider rather than
(to remain) a team member.
5 Constitutional economics of Anti-Sharing
This section compares two contractual arrangements: the Sharing contract
and the internal Anti-Sharing contract. Consider a team of n members that
operates under a sharing contract. Assume that no player n + 1 is available
to play the role of an external Anti-Sharer. In this situation, the team will
ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to switch to an Anti-Sharing contract only if this is Pareto-
superior. This problem is analyzed in section 5.1.
Pareto-superiority, however, leaves the question unanswered which team
member shall assume the role of the Anti-Sharer. If the productivity of
the team members is homogenous, then a constitutional equilibrium requires
the payoﬀs for both roles (Anti-Sharer and productive team member) to be
equal. This is discussed in section 5.2. If agents are heterogenous with re-
spect to their marginal productivity or their cross derivatives, then the role
of the Anti-Insurer should be assigned in order to minimize the productivity
loss.
5.1 Eﬃciency
This section derives the condition under which internal Anti-Sharing imple-
ments a better solution than the Sharing contract analyzed in Holmstrom
(1982). Moreover, we discuss under which conditions the introduction of
Anti-Sharing is even Pareto-superior for the team members.
Under a budget-balanced Sharing contract, the agents 1..n spend eﬀorts E0
and generate the output Y 0 = Y (E0), yielding the total net beneﬁt Y (E0) − Pn
i=1 ci(ei). The net beneﬁt under Anti-Sharing is greater if, and only if,
15Y ( ˆ E(−n),0) −
n−1 X
i=1







which is equivalent to









For simplicity, we have written ˆ Y = Y ( ˆ E(n−1),0). The improvement in out-
put is required to be greater than the increase in eﬀort costs, net of the eﬀort
costs saved by player n (who assumes the role of the Anti-Sharer). This
condition is more likely to hold, the smaller the cross partials ∂2Y/∂ei∂en for
i = 1..(n − 1), and the smaller the marginal productivity of player n.
If this condition holds, and the only available institutions are Sharing con-
tracts and internal Anti-Sharing contracts, then the latter is Kaldor-Hicks
eﬃcient. The more interesting question is whether Anti-Sharing is Pareto-
superior, compared to the Sharing contract. This requires each individual
payoﬀ (for player i = 1..n) to be greater when an Anti-Sharer is employed,
which can be guaranteed by side payments, as the following proposition
states:
Proposition 4: If a team of n members can only choose between
a Sharing contract and an internal Anti-Sharing contract, and
the latter is Kaldor-Hicks-eﬃcient, then a vector of lump-sum
payments (T1,T2,...,T(n−1)) exists such that the internal Anti-
Sharing contract is Pareto-superior.







where ∆Y denotes the increase in output (∆Y = ˆ Y − Y 0, whereas ∆ci rep-
resents the increase in costs that player i bears: ∆ci = ci(ˆ e)−ci(e0). Pareto-
superiority of the internal Anti-Sharing contract requires two conditions to
be fulﬁlled:15
15At least one of the conditions a) and b) needs to be strictly fulﬁlled.
16a) ∀i = 1..(n − 1) :
ˆ Y
n−1 − siY 0 ≥ ∆ci + Ti
b)
Pn−1
i=1 ≥ snY 0 − cn(e0)
If a vector of lump-sum fees Ti fulﬁlls condition a), then this implies
n−1 X
i=1








The right-hand side of this inequality denotes the incremental rent generated
by the eﬀorts of agents i = 1..(n−1) by switching to the internal Anti-Sharing
contract. Kaldor-Hicks-eﬃciency implies that this rent is greater than the
payoﬀ of player n under a Sharing contract:













Thus, lump-sum fee vector the components of which add up to less than the
complete rent, but more than π0
n can satisfy condition a) and b) simultane-
ously.
5.2 Constitutional equilibrium
We have assumed that the activity of the Anti-Sharer can be carried out
without cost. Thus, the Anti-Sharer’s payoﬀ is
Pn−1





ˆ Y − Ti − ci(ˆ ei)
each.
Consider now the constitutional stage of this partnership: If the n partners
assign the roles of the Anti-Sharer and the productive agents through nego-
tiations, a constitutional equilibrium would require all individual payoﬀs to
be equal. Otherwise, on of the roles would be more attractive than the other.
In algebraic terms, the constitutional equilibrium condition is







ˆ Y − Ti − ci(ˆ ei)
17which is equivalent to







Ti − ci(ˆ ei).
Given the assumption of a symmetric solution, the total fee collected by the
Anti-Sharer is
∀ i = 1..n :
n−1 X
i=1

























Note that the left hand side of equation (7) shows the nth player’s equilibrium
payoﬀ, i.e., the sum of fees. The right hand side represents the cooperation
rent if players 1..(n−1) choose optimal eﬀort, which they do in equilibrium.
The equation demonstrates that, in an equilibrium among the n agents with
player n specializing into the role of the Anti-Sharer while the other (n −
1) remain productive, the Anti-Sharer receives the nth part of the optimal
cooperation rent. This implies that all of the n players share the cooperation
rent evenly.
Interesting question: Given XAS is Kaldor-Hicks eﬃcient. Do the
constitutional equilibrium condition and the payment scheme that
implements Pareto-eﬃcient exclude each other or are they consis-
tent?
186 Conclusions
To implement eﬃciency requires the Anti-Sharer not to take part in the
productive activity. Thus, if one player specializes on the role of the Anti-
Sharer, the lack of his eﬀort leads to a productivity loss. However, this
division of labor between him and his (n − 1) colleagues leads to a second-
best eﬀort choice of the latter. If the resulting cooperation rent exceeds the
one under spontaneous team work (which is necessarily below the ﬁrst best
cooperation rent), then each can be made better oﬀ by an equal split.
Even though this mechanism is not budget-balanced, it is credible, since it
is in the Anti-Sharer’s interest to retain the lump-sum payment if the other
agents fail to provide eﬃcient eﬀort. The necessary ex-ante and ex-post
payments are contractible, as long as the actual output is veriﬁable. In case
the nth agent remains productive, this rule does not implement the ﬁrst-best
outcome.
We think that this mechanism provides a new theory of the ﬁrm, at least as
far it concerns partnerships of risk-neutral teams. Apart from the theory of
the ﬁrm in Alchian /Demsetz (1972) and from the sequential team mechanism
in Strausz (1999), our theory does not require the nth agent to be able to
monitor the other agents’ eﬀort choices.
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